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Abstract
This paper employs a theoretical framework that allows for both direct and indirect impacts of trade
liberalization on productivity growth. Indirect impacts operate through both scale eﬀects as well as a
diﬀerential impact on ﬁrms conditional on their distance from the international technological frontier.
Empirical results from panel estimations for the South African manufacturing sector are reported. Results
conﬁrm that the greatest positive impact of trade liberalization will be on small rather than large sectors
of the manufacturing sector, while South African manufacturing sectors do not lag suﬃciently behind the
technological frontier for trade liberalization to exert a negative impact on productivity growth. While
there does appear to be a positive direct impact of protection on productivity growth, the impact is small,
and once indirect trade impacts are accoutned for, the net eﬀect of liberalization on growth is positive
for South African manufacturing. Further results conﬁrm the positive impact of scale of production on
productivity growth, while pricing power as well as industry concentration in the manufacturing sector
are strongly negatively associated with productivity growth. Finally, while nominal depreciation of the
exchange rate is associated with increased productivity growth in South African manufacturing, the
eﬀect is economically very small. Policy implications to follow from the analysis aﬃrms the importance
of trade liberalization as a means of raising productivity growth, and the inferiority of nominal exchange
rate depreciation in raising productivity growth.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
T h ee x i s t i n gl i t e r a t u r eo nt r a d ea n dg r o w t hm e n t i ons a variety of factors that may potentially aﬀect the
impact of trade liberalization on economic development. For example, Alesina et al (2005) point to a market
size eﬀect or a scale eﬀect whereby the larger the domestic economy relative to the world economy, the
less innovation or learning-by-doing domestic producers gain by opening up to trade.1 This is explained
by the fact that small economies gain proportionately more from opening in terms of scale eﬀects than do
large producers. Other authors point to the possibility that growth might be less enhanced by openness
in more advanced countries, reﬂecting a knowledge spillover eﬀect whereby trade induces knowledge ﬂows
across countries, such that more advanced countries stand to gain proportionately less from such knowledge
spill-overs.2
But there is an additional eﬀect of trade on growth which has not been much analyzed so far: namely that
trade liberalization tends to enhance product market competition, by allowing foreign producers to compete
with domestic producers. This in turn should enhance domestic productivity for at least two reasons. First,
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1This result was ﬁrst pointed out by Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2003). In Aghion and Howitt (2007) scale is given by
population size.
2This knowledge spillover eﬀe c th a sb e e na n a l y z e da tl e n g t hb yK e l l e r( 2 0 0 4 )-a n ds e ea l s oS a c h sa n dW a r n e r( 1 9 9 5 )a n d
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1by forcing the most unproductive ﬁrms out of the domestic market.3 Second, by forcing domestic ﬁrms to
innovate in order to escape competition with their new foreign counterparts.
In this paper we test for these eﬀects in a middle income country context, using South African man-
ufacturing sector data. The analysis of cross country growth regressions hides signiﬁcant heterogeneity at
the sectoral level. Schumpeterian growth theory operates on an understanding of ﬁrm level dynamics, while
the national dimension strictly just provides the institutional background to ﬁrm’s optimizing decisions. For
an accurate picture of the relationship between trade policies and growth, analysis should be conducted at
least at the industry level of a speciﬁc country, The case of South Africa is interesting because it appears
as a natural experiment of gradual liberalization, it is sectorally heterogeneous and has signiﬁcant internal
market monopolies.
Previous studies have examined the relationship between pricing power of industry and growth,4 market
structure and growth,5 investment in R&D and human capital and growth,6 and one study has considered
the relationship between openness and growth of total factor productivity in the South African context.
It found a strong positive correlation, although mitigated by market imperfections, but the speciﬁcation
estimated did not capture the full set of theoretical cons i d e r a t i o n sd e t a i l e db e l o w( a si st r u eo fm o s ts t u d i e s
examining trade and growth eﬀects).
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the composition and the nature of productivity gains (if any)
that result from trade liberalization. Section 2 of the paper outlines the theoretical framework employed in
the paper. Section 3 provides background on the nature and extent of South African trade liberalization. In
section 4 the empirical strategy of the paper is explained, including the data sets employed, while section 5
reports estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
We use the Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth, which we ﬁrst describe for the case of a closed
economy and then extend to the case of an open economy. This section draws unrestrainely from Aghion
and Howitt (2007).
2.1 The Closed Economy Case
Consider ﬁrst the closed-economy version of the model. A unique ﬁnal good, which also serves as numéraire,







itdi, 0 <α<1 (1)
where L is the domestic labor force, assumed constant, Ait is the quality of intermediate good i at time t,
and xit is the ﬂow quantity of intermediate good i b e i n gp r o d u c e da n du s e da tt i m et.
Each intermediate sector has a monopolist producer who uses the ﬁnal good as the sole input, with one
unit of ﬁnal good needed to produce each unit of intermediate good. The monopolist’s cost of production
is therefore equal to the quantity produced xit. The price pit at which this quantity of intermediate good is
sold to the competitive ﬁnal sector is the marginal product of intermediate good i in (1). The monopolist
will choose the proﬁt maximizing level of output:
xit = AitLα2/(1−α) (2)
with proﬁtl e v e l :
πit = δAitL (3)
where δ ≡ (1 − α)α
1+α
1−α.
3For instance Treﬂer (2004) shows that trade liberalization in Canada resulted in a 6% increase in average productivity.
4See Aghion, Braun and Fedderke (2006).
5See Fedderke and Szalontai (2005) and Fedderke and Naumann (2005).
6See Fedderke (2006).
2Equilibrium level of ﬁnal output in the economy can be found by substituting the xit’s into (1), which
yields
Yt = ζAtL (4)
where At is the average productivity parameter across all sectors At =
R 1
0 Aitdi,a n dζ = α
2α
1−α.
Equilibrium level of national income, Nt,d i ﬀers from ﬁnal sector output Yt,s i n c es o m eﬁnal goods are
used up in producing the intermediate products. There are only two forms of income - wage income and
proﬁt income. Total wage income is the fraction 1 − α of ﬁnal output:
Wt = L × ∂Yt∂/L =( 1− α)Yt
Proﬁts are earned only by the local monopolists who sell intermediate products to the ﬁnal sector (the ﬁnal
good sector is perfectly competitive and under constant returns to scale). Since each monopolist charges a
price equal to 1/α and has a cost per unit equal to 1, therefore a proﬁt margin on each unit sold of (1 − α)pit,












Hence national income is:







which is strictly proportional to average productivity and to population.
Productivity growth comes from innovations. In each sector, at each date there is a unique entrepreneur
with the possibility of innovating in that sector. She is the incumbent monopolist, and an innovation would
enable her to produce with a productivity (quality) parameter Ait = γAi,t−1 that is superior to that of the
previous monopolist, by the factor γ>1. Otherwise her productivity parameter stays the same: Ait = Ai,t−1.
Innovation with any given probability μ entails the cost cit(μ)=( 1− τ) · φ(μ) · Ai,t−1,o ft h eﬁnal good
in research, where τ>0 is a parameter that represents the extent to which national policies (institutions)
encourage innovation, and φ is a standard convex cost function. Thus the local entrepreneur’s expected net
proﬁti s :
Vit = Eπit − cit(μ)
= μδLγAi,t−1 +( 1− μ)δLAi,t−1 − (1 − τ)φ(μ)Ai,t−1
Each local entrepreneur will choose a frequency of innovations μ∗ that maximizes Vit. The ﬁrst-order condition
f o ra ni n t e r i o rm a x i m u m∂Vit/∂μ =0 , can be expressed as the research arbitrage equation:
φ
0 (μ)=δL(γ − 1)/(1 − τ). (6)
If the research environment is favorable enough (τ is large enough), or the population large enough, so that:
φ
0 (0) >δ L(γ − 1)/(1 − τ)
then the unique solution μ to (6) is positive, so in each sector the probability of an innovation is that solution
(b μ = μ), otherwise the local entrepreneur chooses never to innovate (b μ =0 ) . Since each Ait grows at the rate
γ −1 with probability b μ, and at the rate 0 with probability 1− b μ, the expected growth rate of the economy
is:
g = b μ(γ − 1)
So we see that countries with a larger population and more favorable innovation conditions will be more
likely to grow, and grow faster.
32.2 Opening the Economy
Now open trade in goods (both intermediate and ﬁnal) between the domestic country and the rest of the
world. For simplicity, assume two countries, “home” and “foreign,” with an identical range of intermediate
and ﬁnal product, and no transportation costs. Within each intermediate sector the world market can then
be monopolized by the lowest cost producer. Asterisks denote foreign-country variables.
The immediate eﬀect of this opening up is to allow each country to take advantage of more productive










itdi, 0 <α<1 (7)
where b Ait is the higher of the two initial productivity parameters b Ait =m a x{Ait,A ∗
it}. Symmetrically for
the foreign country.
Monopolists’ proﬁt will now be higher than under autarky, because of increased market size. For price
pit, ﬁnal good producers will buy good i up to the point where marginal product equals pit:
xit = b AitL(pit/α)
1
α−1 and x∗
it = b AitL∗ (pit/α)
1
α−1 (8)




(L + L∗) b Ait
!α−1
(9)
Accordingly the monopolist’s proﬁt πit will equal revenue pitXit minus cost Xit, and proﬁt maximization
requires that:
Xit = b Ait (L + L∗)α2/(1−α)
with price pit =1 /α and proﬁt level:
πit = δ b Ait (L + L∗) (10)
Substitution of prices pit =1 /α into the demand functions (8) yields
xit = b AitLα2/(1−α) and x∗
it = b AitL∗α2/(1−α)
and substituting these into the production functions, ﬁnal good production in the two countries will be
proportional to their populations:
Yt = ζ b AtL and Y ∗
t = ζ b AtL∗ (11)




Predictions for the impact of opening the economy to trade now follow.
2.3 The Impact of Trade Liberalization
2.3.1 On National Income
The impact of trade liberalization on national income operates through three distinct channels in the model:
• Through the selection eﬀect of increased competition,7 such that ﬁrms buy intermediate products from
the most eﬃcient producer leading to exit of less eﬃcient producers, increasing eﬃciency and hence
raising aggregate incomes. In the present model this arises since total world income of the world







L b At + L∗ b At
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ζ (LAt + L∗A∗
t)
7S e eM e l i t z( 2 0 0 3 ) .
4Total world income is raised by international trade since the average productivity parameter b At is
generally larger than either At or A∗
t. Given that each county’s pre-trade average productivity includes
some sectors in which trade provides access to a higher productivity ( b Ait >A it), while in sectors where
the home country obtains the monopoly there is no productivity loss ( b Ait = Ait). Hence average b Ait
is larger than average Ait, necessarily. Symmetrically for the A∗
it’s. Note therefore that international
trade raises total world income through the selection eﬀect.











(1 − α) b AtL + α(1 − α)
Z 1
0
λit b Ait (L + L∗)di
¸
ζ
To isolate the impact of scale (population size) for any given level of technological development, assume
home and foreign countries to start at equal levels of technological development, such that in half of
the sectors the home country starts with higher productivity and captures the monopoly, while in
the other half the foreign country captures the monopoly, with both countries realizing average global
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It follows directly that the smaller the country, as measured by L, the larger the proportional gain from
liberalization. By opening up to international trade, technologically advanced intermediate producers
can now sell their products to a larger market. The smaller was the market before opening up the
bigger this gain will be.
• Through the backwardness eﬀect, by which technologically less advanced countries seemed to gain more
from openness. Repeating the analysis for the scale eﬀect, but setting both countries to be of equal













0 λit b Aitdi
(1 + α)At
where the ﬁrst term represents wage income and the second proﬁt income, both relative to pre-trade
national income. Now while opening up to trade will deﬁnitely raise wage income, since workers will
be working with more advanced intermediate inputs and hence will be more productive, it might not
raise the home country’s proﬁt income. Where the home country lags behind the foreign country in
every sector, λit =0in all sectors i, hence the proﬁt component of national income would vanish as
a result of openness, such that the gain in wage income might not be enough to compensate for the
loss of proﬁt income. Even in this extreme case, however, if the country starts far enough behind the
rest of the world, i.e. At < b A/(1 + α),t h e nN0
t/Nt > 1, such that the country will deﬁnitely gain
from international trade, and gain more in relative terms the further behind it starts. Nonetheless, the
net eﬀect of backwardness is not quite as clear cut as in the case of the scale eﬀect, and we should be
aware that although international trade raises total world income through the selection eﬀect, there is
no guarantee that it will raise national income in every country.
52.3.2 On Innovation
The impact of trade liberalization on innovation is analogous to that of competition on innovation.8 Here
the stylization is that the competitor comes from the foreign country. Three possibilities must be considered:
A Case A is the case in which the lead in sector i resides in the home country, while the foreign country
lags behind. In this case the open economy research arbitrage equation governing μA:
(1 − τ)φ
0 (μA)/δ =( γ − 1)(L + L∗)+μ∗
AL∗ (12)
makes clear that for the technology leader innovation will be greater than under the closed economy
(compare equation 6). This arises because of:
• Scale eﬀects realized because the successful innovator gets enhanced proﬁts from both markets
(L + L∗), not just the domestic market, L, thus giving a stronger incentive to innovate.
• Escape entry eﬀects arising because the unsuccessful innovator in the open economy is at risk of
losing the foreign market to the foreign rival, avoidable by innovation (μ∗
AL∗). The unsuccessful
innovator in the closed economy loses nothing to a foreign rival and thus does not have this extra
incentive to innovate.
B Case B is the case in which the domestic and foreign sectors are neck-and-neck. In this case the open
economy research arbitrage equation governing μB:
(1 − τ)φ
0 (μB)/δ =( γ − 1)L + μ∗
BL +( 1− μ∗
B)γL∗
again has scale ((1 − μ∗
B)γL∗) and escape competition (μ∗
BL) eﬀects, with symmetrical intuition as for
μA above.
C Case C is the case in which the foreign country starts with the lead. Here the open economy research
arbitrage equation governing μC:
(1 − τ)φ
0 (μC)/δ =( 1− μ∗
C)L
shows that sectors behind the world technology frontier may be discouraged from innovating by the
threat of entry because even if it innovates it might lose out to a superior entrant. Provided that the
foreign country’s innovation rate is large enough when it has the lead, then the right-hand side of this
research arbitrage equation will be strictly less than that of the closed economy (compare equation 6),
so we will have μC <μ .
It follows that μA >μ , μB >μ ,a n dμ∗
C >μ ∗, μ∗
B >μ ∗,w i t hμC and μ∗
A indeterminate. It therefore
follows that a suﬃcient (not necessary) condition for the innovation of the domestic economy to be higher





Where does the preceding leave us in terms of a set of priors for purposes of empirical testing of the theory?
We summarize brieﬂy as follows:
• Selection eﬀects predict a positive eﬀect of measures of openness on income. In addition, trade will
increase the productivity of the ﬁnal sector everywhere.
• Scale eﬀects predict:
— A negative impact from the interaction of openness and size on income; i.e. smaller countries
should gain proportionately more from openness than large countries.
8See Aghion et al (2005), Aghion and Griﬃth (2005), and Aghion et al (2006).
6— A negative impact from the interaction of openness and size on growth; i.e. smaller countries
should gain proportionately more from openness than large countries.
• Backwardness eﬀects predict:
— An ambiguous eﬀect from the interaction of openness and distance from the technological frontier
on income. As long as the distance is not excessive, the impact should be positive; the greater the
distance, the greater the proportionate gain from openness. However, where the distance from
the frontier is too great, the impact can be reversed.
— An ambiguous eﬀect from the interaction of openness and distance from the technological frontier
on growth. While ﬁrms that are the technological leader, or that are at level pegging with the
technological leader should increase innovation under trade liberalization, ﬁrms that lag behind
the technological leader may decrease productivity growth if the lag is large enough. The net
eﬀect is ambiguous.
Given that the impact of openness on income captures steady state eﬀects, we note that in the general case
of countries still subject to development, the distinction between income and growth eﬀects will be diﬃcult
to identify empirically. Thus particularly the backwardness eﬀect will be subject to empirical validation.
3 The South African Experience of Trade Liberalization and Growth
South Africa represents an interesting natural experiment where the process of liberalization of trade can be
well located in time and at the sectoral level.
Fedderke and Vaze (2001) examine the extent to which South Africa’s trade regime has opened up since
the implementation of trade liberalization measures (i.e., during the course of the 1990s). They consider 38
sectors of the South African economy. They ﬁnd that the hype about “signiﬁcant trade liberalization” is not
borne out by the data. In particular, in terms of the eﬀective rates of protection (ERP), trade liberalization
has had a limited eﬀect on eﬀective protection of South African industries. South African industries are still
heavily protected. In some industries, protection appears to have increased (Fedderke and Vaze (2001).9
Fedderke and Vaze qualify their ﬁndings by pointing out that ERP may not be a good measure of the extent
of trade liberalization in the context of South Africa’s trade regime (p. 471).10
Edwards (2005) provides the most recent re-evaluation of the extent to which South Africa has liberalized
its trade since the late 1980s. He ﬁnds that signiﬁcant progress has been made in terms of reducing tariﬀ
protection. In particular, between 1994 and 2004, the “eﬀective protection in manufacturing fell from 48%
to 12.7%” (p. 774).11 Moreover, the pace at which liberalization has taken place is in line with the pace
in other lower-middle income countries. Edwards’s ﬁndings appear to support the conclusion of Fedderke
and Vaze (2001, 2004) that liberalization has been incomplete. In particular, Edwards notes that further
progress (in the simpliﬁcation of tariﬀ structures and reduction of protection) can be made since eﬀective
protection still remains high in some sectors.12
9This ﬁnding is in line with the ﬁndings of Fedderke et al (2003) and Aghion et al (2007) of high mark-ups in South African
manufacturing sectors. As Fedderke and Vaze (2001) point out, ERP measures the shelter that a sector has from international
prices and is thus a proxy for excess returns a sector can realize due to protective trade (p. 437).
10This is because a signiﬁcant feature of SA’s trade liberalization has been the movement from quantitative restrictions
(quotas) to tariﬀ lines. In this case, eﬀective protections rates may understate the extent of trade liberalization (Fedderke and
Vaze (2001: 471)). Rangasamy and Harmse (2003) have also challenged the ﬁndings of Fedderke and Vaze (2001) — in particular
their conclusion that protection appears to have increased over the period under study. They conclude that, based on ERP
analysis, tariﬀ protection has largely decreased. Fedderke and Vaze (2004), in their response to Rangasamy and Harmse, note
that their main ﬁnding of the original study, that more of South Africa’s output is protected in 1998 than in 1988 (i.e. once
GDP weighted protection measures are used), is in principle actually conﬁrmed by the Rangasamy and Harmse study (Fedderke
and Vaze (2004; 411)).
11These percentages are unweighted averages. Fedderke and Vaze (2001) use GDP weighted EPRs.
12Ibid.
74 Empirical Strategy
4.1 The Data Sets
For this study we employ three distinct data sources. Confronted with gaps in ﬁrm-level data over the past
ten years, we use:
1. Industry-level panel data for South Africa and for more than 100 countries since the mid 1960s, obtained
from UNIDO’s International Industry Statistics 2004. This data set contains yearly information on
output, value added, total wages, and employment, gross capital formation and the distribution of
value added between factor inputs for 28 diﬀerent manufacturing industries in more than 100 countries
from 1963-2002. From the gross capital formation data we compute capital stock data on the basis of
the perpetual inventory methodology.13 Chief use of the UNIDO database is to compute USA total
factor productivity, in order to establish the distance from the international productivity frontier of
South African 3-digit manufacturing industry.
2. Industry-level panel data for South Africa from the Trade and Industry Policy Strategies (TIPS)
database. The data employed for this study focus on the three digit manufacturing industries, over the
1970-2004 period. Variables for the manufacturing sector include the output, capital stock, and labour
force variables their associated growth rates, the distribution of value added between factor inputs,
and the skills composition of the South African manufacturing labour force by manufacturing sector.
Data are obtained from the Trade and Industrial Strategies (TIPS) data base.
3. For our openness indicators, we employ data on eﬀective rates of protection, scheduled tariﬀ rates,
export taxes and a measure of anti-export bias, obtained from Edwards (2005).
4. For measures of industry pricing power, we employ the estimated values of the mark-up of price over
marginal cost of production obtained from the Roeger (1995) methodology, of Fedderke and Hill (2007)
and Aghion et al (2006).
5. For measures of market structure, we reply on the industry concentration measures of Fedderke and
Szalontai (2005) and Fedderke and Naumann (2005).
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.
While most indicators employed for this study are available over the 1970-2004 or 1970-2002 period, the
trade measures are restricted to the 1988-2003 period. In addition, data comparability issues between the US
and SA reduced the total number of comparable sectorsf r o m2 8t o2 3s e c t o r s .T h el i s to fs e c t o r si n c l u d e d
in the panel is that speciﬁed in Table 1. This generated a panel of dimension 23 × 15 = 345 observations.
There are questions over the reliability of South African industry data post-1996. Since the last South
African manufacturing survey was undertaken in 1996, data post-1996 have been disaggregated from the
2-digit sector level on the basis of a single input-output table. The large sample manufacturing survey of
2001 does not appear to have been incorporated into the data (at least not reliably so), and moreover the
2001 survey has not released the labour component of the survey. The reliability of the data has suﬀered as
a result of this data collection strategy. See the discussion in Aghion et al (2006) for more detail.
4.2 The Distance From Frontier Measures
Following Aghion et al (2005) and Aghion and Griﬃth (2005), we generate and industry and time speciﬁc
measure of distance from the technological frontier, under the assumption that the USA constitutes the
technological leader for South African industry. The measure we employ is given by
Mi,t = tfpSA,i,t/tfpUS,i,t
where the measure of distance from the frontier, M, for industry i in year t,i nc o u n t r yX =[ SA,US],i s
the diﬀerence between total factor productivity (TFP) in the US from that in SA for that industry and
13Since the comparison of distance from the frontier is conducted over the 1970-2002 period, and data for the US is available
from 1963, implementation employed a seven year lead, under an assumption of 15% depreciation rates.
8year. TFP is computed by means of the primal decomposition, with factor shares given by the share of
labour remuneration in value added.14 We compute the distance measure both by comparing US TFP with
Rand-denominated and Dollar-denominated South African TFP.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE.
Table 2 summarizes the evidence.
We ﬁnd three broad patterns in the data.
One grouping of thirteen sectors sees a steady widening of the technological gap between South African
and US TFP. While for six sectors the widening gap occurs from a base that is already very low (deﬁned
as less than 10% of US TFP productivity levels),15 for two sectors there is a collapse of TFP productivity
oﬀ relatively high levels (deﬁned as greater than 50% of US TFP productivity levels),16 and for four sectors
the growing productivity gap occurs for mid-range productivity sectors (deﬁned as between 10% and 50% of
US TFP productivity levels).17 Figure 1 illustrates the rising gap for two representative sectors with a high
initial, and a mid-level initial productivity level.
A second grouping of 5 sectors sees a narrowing of the TFP productivity gap between South Africa and
the US - though for a number of these sectors the ﬁnal few years sees a reversal in the trend. Again, there
is a distinction between one sector for which the productivity gain has been substantial (to the point of
rising to TFP productivity levels that exceed that of the US),18 and four sectors for which the gain has been
moderate.19 Figure 2 illustrates for two representative cases of moderate productivity gain (Wood & wood
products) and substantial productivity gain (Plastics & plastic products).
The third grouping of ﬁve sectors sees a catch-up of South African TFP productivity levels with the
US from 1988 through the mid-1990s, but with a subsequent reversal in the catch-up. In the case of one
sector this decline is both dramatic and oﬀ a relatively high base,20 for two sectors the decline occurs oﬀ a
mid-level plateau,21 one sector experiences both substantial catch-up but equivalent decline toward the end
of our sample period,22 and for one sector the movements are small leaving the sector at moderate US TFP
productivity levels throughout.23
What is particularly noteworthy is that productivity catch-up for South African manufacturing sectors
does not in general occur in sectors that are obviously natural resource extractive. Non-metallic minerals,
Basic iron & steel, Basic non-ferrous metals, Metal products, and Paper & paper products all consistently
lose ground relative to US productivity levels, and in the case of virtually all of these sectors South African
TFP productivity is never close to US levels - the only possible exception is Paper & paper products.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE.
However, given the ﬁndings of Aghion et al (2007) on the impact of market structure on productivity
growth, and of Fedderke (2006) on the impact of poor human capital endowments and low R&D investment
by South African manufacturing on productivity growth, these ﬁndings are not surprising.
4.3 The Measure of Scale
Earlier studies employed the total labour force of countries as a measure of scale While measures of sectoral
employment might constitute a comparable measure for our study, for South Africa there is considerable
evidence that technological change has been labour saving.24 We therefore use an alternative measure of
14Thus tfpit =
•




L/L,w h e r eY denotes value added, K capital, L employment, and sL labour
remuneration as a proportion of value added.
15Beverages, Tobacco, Leather & leather products, Industrial chemicals, Basic non-ferrous metals, Other manufacturing
equipment.
16Footwear and Paper & paper products.
17Food, Non-metallic mineral products, Basic iron & steel, Metal products.
18Plastics & plastic products.
19Wearing apparel, Wood & wood products, Furniture, Rubber & rubber products.
20Television, radio & communication equipment.
21Textiles and Professional & scientiﬁce q u i p m e n t .
22Glass & glass products.
23Machinery & equipment.
24See for instance the discussion in Banerjee et al (2007), Fedderke, Shin and Vaze (2005) and Rodrick (2006).
9scale, designed to capture not only the absolute size of the South African manufacturing sectors, but their




where VA X,i,t denotes value added of industry i in year t,i nc o u n t r yX =[ SA,US]. Our scale measure is
thus a measure of the size of South African manufacturing industries relative to comparable industries of
the USA, where the latter serves as proxy for world market size.
Advantage of the measure is that it will not overstate gains in scale simply due to growth in South
African sectors which lies below the growth in world markets. The obvious disadvantage of the measure is
that a gain in scale may not reﬂect growth in the South African sector, but rather a relative decline in the
corresponding sector in the USA.
Table 4 reports summary results of the measure over the 1970-2002 period. There is strong sectoral
variation in performance. Two sectors gained in scale relative to the USA by more than 20 percentage
points,25 four by between 10 and 20 percentage points,26 10 sectors posted marginal gains (0-10 percentage
points), but 6 sectors also actively lost scale relative to the USA.27
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE.
4.4 The Empirical Speciﬁcation to be Tested
We brieﬂy summarize the empirical predictions of the preceding theoretical analysis highlighted in section
2.4. First, trade liberalization increases aggregate productivity (and wages). Second, whereas scale of
production should have a direct positive impact on growth, smaller sectors should respond more strongly
to trade liberalization. Third, whereas sectors with ﬁrms at considerable distance from the technological
frontier grow more slowly (since ﬁrms do not innovate), the impact of trade liberalization is ambiguous.
Innovation in sectors in which ﬁrms are closer to the technological frontier reacts positively to an increase in
product market competition due to trade liberalization - but where they lag considerably behind the frontier,
the impact of the liberalization reverses.
To test these predictions of the theoretical framework, we examine productivity dynamics in South African
manufacturing sectors for the period 1988-2002. The basic speciﬁcation relates productivity dynamics to
trade policy and distance from the technological leader. Formally:
∆Ait = a0 + a1Mi,t + a2Pi,t + a3Mi,tPi,t + a4Si,t + a5Si,tPi,t + a6Mi,tSi,t + αi + βt + uit (13)
where ∆Ait is productivity growth in sector i in year t, Mi,t is the distance from the technological frontier
deﬁned above, Pit is a measure of eﬀective trade barriers as obtained form Edwards (2005) - see the discussion
in the data section above. The P measure is given by measures of nominal tariﬀs, of eﬀective protection
rates, of export taxes and of anti-export bias. The measure is thus an inverse of openness. The term
MitPi,t represents an interaction term that captures the relationship between openness and technological
innovation. The Si,t measure denotes the scale variable deﬁned in section 4.3, while Si,tPi,t is an interaction
term capturing the relationship between openness and scale of production. Finally, αi and βt represent ﬁxed
and time eﬀects respectively.
Priors are that a1 > 0, i.e. the larger is the distance from the technological frontier the lower is the
productivity growth (there is no incentive to innovate as catching up is less likely), a2 < 0, i.e. either by
preventing an increase of technological innovation by more advanced ﬁrms or by preventing the import of
new technology protection (as an inverse of openness) induces a decrease in the level of productivity, and
a3 ≶ 0, where if distance from the frontier is not too large, the maximum eﬀect of trade liberalization occurs
in sectors that are closer to the technological frontier, but with the reverse impact under conditions where
distance is substantial. Note therefore that isolation of a statistically signiﬁcant impact of the interaction
across sectors that are heterogeneous in their distance from the frontier may be diﬃcult (positive and negative
25Footwear and Other manufacturing.
26Beverages, Leather & leather products, Basic iron & steel and Basic non-ferrous metals.
27Tobacco (strongly), Non-metallic minerals, Metal products excluding machinery, Machinery & equipment, Transport equip-
ment, Professional & scientiﬁce q u i p m e n t .
10associations may cancel). Finally, our theoretical framework anticipates that a4 > 0, such that sectors that
operate under larger scale realize higher productivity growth, but smaller sectors realize larger gains in scale
of production from trade liberalization, such that a5 < 0. In terms of the interaction of the scale and distance
dimensions, the beneﬁts of both scale and closeness to the frontier suggest a prior of a6 > 0.
We note from the outset that the distance measure, Mi,t,i si sc o r r e l a t e dw i t huit by deﬁnition, neces-
sitating an instrumentation strategy in estimation. The scale measure, Si,t, may be similarly subject to
endogeneity bias, as may be the measures of trade protection, Pi,t.
Speciﬁcation (13) ignores a number of additional factors known to be relevant to productivity growth
in the context of trade liberalization. First, Aghion et al (2006) demonstrated both that product market
competition has strong predictive power for productivity growth in South African manufacturing, and that
pricing power of domestic producers in manufacturing appears to be substantial. Rodrick (2006) however
has argued that the relative price of manufacturing in the South African economy has declined, due in
considerable measure to the rising import penetration associated with the liberalization of the economy,
placing domestic producers under a proﬁt squeeze. For this reason we also test for the impact both of a
Lerner index of pricing power,28 and of the Rosenbluth index of industry concentration29 while controlling
for trade openness eﬀects, to test for the robustness of the product market competition eﬀect in the presence
of controls for trade liberalization.30
In the South African context it is also often argued that depreciation of the exchange rate is an under-
utilized instrument in promoting growth,31 by raising the export competitiveness of domestic producers. In
presenting evidence on the distance measure to be employed in section 4.2, we have seen that the exchange
rate may well be important in determining international rates of return. On the other hand, in the context
of the signiﬁcant potential impact of pricing power in South African manufacturing, we note from the outset
that the impact of the exchange rate may not be unambiguous. Depreciation of the domestic currency may
promote the international competitiveness of domestic producers - but it also eﬀectively serves to protect
them from import competition. The substantial depreciation of the currency noted in Figure 4 suggests that
this eﬀect may not have been inconsiderable during the 1990s. The impact of the nominal exchange rate on
productivity growth is thus ambiguous, and a matter of empirical determination.
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE.
Finally, given the frequent suggestions that skills shortages constrain growth in South Africa, we also
control for the skills composition of the manufacturing sectors. The variable is deﬁned as the ratio of highly
skilled and skilled workers to the total workforce.
5R e s u l t s
Estimation proceeds for the panel of South African manufacturing sectors listed in Table 1, controlling for
industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects. Results of estimation are reported in Tables 5 for estimations controlling for
ﬁxed and time eﬀects, and Table 6 for estimations under GMM in order to control for the endogeneity of
t h ed i s t a n c ea n ds c a l ev a r i a b l e s .
INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE.
Results from estimation are as follows. Consider the baseline estimations of Table 5 which do not allow
for the endogeneity of the distance and scale measures through GMM estimation. We note from the outset
that our results are robust to controlling for endogeneity through GMM estimation. For this reason we begin
with the discussion of the baseline results, noting modulations to emerge from the GMM estimations where
appropriate.
28Mark-ups are obtained following the contributions by Hall (1990) and Roeger (1995) by means of:
NSR = ∆(p + q) − α · ∆(w + l) − (1 − α) · ∆(r + k)
=( μ − 1) · α · [∆(w + l) − ∆(r + k)]
where μ = P/MC,w i t hP denoting price, and MC denoting marginal cost. Under perfect competition μ =1 ,w h i l ei m p e r f e c t l y
competitive markets allow μ>1. ∆ denotes the diﬀerence operator, lower case denotes the natural log transform, q, l,a n dk
denote real value-added, labour, and capital inputs, and α is the labour share in value-added. See the additional discussion in
Fedderke et al (2007).
29Obtained from Fedderke and Naumann (2005).
30Note that as in Aghion et al (2006), lagged values of the two regressors are employed in estimation.
31See again Rodrick (2006), as well as Frankel, Smit and Sturzennegger (2006).
11First, distance from the technological frontier has a positive direct eﬀect on productivity growth - with
greater distance from the frontier assocaited with accelerated productivity growth. However, the ﬁnding
is generally not statistically signiﬁcant (the one exception is the speciﬁcation that utilizes the export tax
speciﬁcation of protection, where the distance measure is signiﬁcant at the 10% level), invariant across the
four distinct measures of trade protection employed in estimation, to industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects, of
considerable economic strength, and with estimated coeﬃcients tightly clustered in the range from −0.07
through −0.13. Speciﬁcally, the implication is that a one percentage point decrease in the distance from the
technological frontier, would be associated with a 7 to 13 percentage point eﬃciency gain in South African
manufacturing, estimated at sample means of South African manufacturing productivity growth and distance
from the frontier.
Second, theoretical priors that scale of production is positively related to productivity growth are also
strongly ratiﬁed, and again the result is statistically as well as economically signiﬁcant, invariant to the
openness measure employed as well as to whether time and industry eﬀects are controlled for in estimation.
The estimated coeﬃcient range from 0.45 through 0.70 implies that if the ratio of South African to US value
added production rises by one percentage point, productivity growth in South African manufacturing would
rise by approximately half a percentage point.
Third, we also note that the impact of scale is not invariant to distance to the technological frontier. The
interaction term between the scale and distance measure is again invariably positively statistically signiﬁcant
across all estimations, regardless of the trade liberalization measure, or whether industry or time eﬀects are
controlled for. The inference is that it is large sectors that are closer to the technological frontier that
experience the most rapid productivity growth, while small sectors far from the frontier grow relatively
slowly. What is more, the range of estimated coeﬃcients from 0.43 through 0.86, again suggesting an
economically strong impact of the scale dimension of production.
Fourth, estimations both conﬁrm and extend the earlier results of Aghion et al (2006). We ﬁnd both
that the proxy for the Lerner index that captures pricing power of South African manufacturing industry, as
well as the Rosenbluth measure of industry concentration are strongly associated with productivity growth,
in the case of the markup variable irrespective of whether industry and/or time eﬀects are controlled for,
and in the case of the market structure variable statistically signiﬁcantly so only in the presence of both
time and industry eﬀects. We also note speciﬁcally that the ﬁnding is invariant to controlling for a wide
range of trade related measures, speciﬁcally the four distinct measures of protection, as well as the exchange
rate. The implication is that the negative association between pricing power, and the associated lack of
competitive pressure in South African manufacturing and productivity growth reported in the earlier study,
is not eroded by the liberalization of the South African trade regime - as suggested by Rodrick (2006). What
is more, once the measures of trade protection are controlled for, the economic impact of pricing power rises,
rather than falls. While Aghion et al (2006) found that a 0.1 unit increase in the Lerner index resulted in the
loss of approximately one percentage point in productivity growth. Estimated coeﬃcients in the presence
of trade eﬀects are again tightly clustered in the −0.20 through −0.35 range. The implication is that a 0.1
unit increase in the Lerner index now results in a 2 to 3.5 percentage point loss in productivity growth,
considerably stronger than in the absence of controlling for the trade regime. The inference is that sectors
not impacted by trade liberalization, have a larger pricing power impact.
While Rodrick (2006) was therefore correct to caution that the trade context is important to the quan-
tiﬁcation of the impact of pricing power on productivity growth, the impact of trade liberalization is not
such as to eliminate the impact of pricing power - instead it enhances its importance. Not controlling for
the reduction in trade protection biases the impact of pricing power downward. Further, and crucially for
the policy context we also note that liberalization of the South African economy is incomplete at present.32
We also note that both pricing power and the index of industry concentration have independent impacts
on productivity growth. The economic magnitude of the concentration index impact is more diﬃcult to
determine, since the Rosenbluth index is distributed across the scale from 1/n to 1,w h e r et h el o w e rb o u n d
obtains when ﬁrms are of equal size. Given the estimated coeﬃcient range of −0.77 to −0.88, the inference
is then that a 0.01 unit increase in the concentration index reduces productivity growth in South African
manufacturing by between 0.77 and 0.88 percentage points,33 thus again suggesting a powerful impact of
32There is extensive evidence and debate on this question. For two recent contributions see Edwards (2005) and Edwards
and Lawrence (2006).
33The impact may appear implausibly large. But given that South African manufacturing sectors over the sample period
12market structure on growth.
Note that for the purpose of policy inference, the implication of this ﬁnding is that both pricing power
as well as market structure are important to productivity growth, strengthening the earlier ﬁndings by
Aghion et al (2006) by rendering them robust to the inclusion of additional regressors. The signiﬁcance of
competition policy as a means of promoting productivity growth is thereby strengthened.
The skills ratio of the labour force enters estimations signiﬁcantly only in the presence of both industry
and time eﬀects, irrespective of which openness measure we employ, and provides a downward correction to
the TFP productivity measure which is appropriate given the inability to control for the improvement in the
quality of the labour input into production under the standard primal growth decomposition that underlies
the computation of TFP.
C r u c i a l l ya n da st h em a i nf o c u so ft h i sp a p e r ,w ec o n s i der the evidence to emerge concerning the openness
and trade related measures employed by the study.
In terms of the theoretical framework proposed by this paper, the real impact of the measure of trade
liberalization emerges through the indirect impacts captured by the interaction terms of the estimation. Most
importantly, from the interaction term between our scale measure and the trade protection measures, we
ﬁnd that a reduction in trade protection statistically signiﬁcantly raises productivity growth more in smaller
manufacturing sectors than in large manufacturing sectors. This ﬁnding is consistent with the expectation
that smaller sectors stand to gain more from an opening of the trade regime in scale of production terms
than do large sectors. The ﬁnding that trade liberalization favours smaller sectors is invariant across the
four measures of trade protection, and to allowing for the possibility of endogeneity.
The theoretical discussion indicated that trade liberalization would have a diﬀerential impact on indus-
trial sectors, depending on how close to the frontier they were located. Sectors close to or at the frontier
would realize a gain in productivity growth, while sectors that lag the frontier by a suﬃciently signiﬁcant
margin, would experience a reduction in productivity growth. The net eﬀe c ti st h u sam a t t e rf o re m p i r i c a l
determination. For the estimations that utilize the eﬀective protection rate and nominal tariﬀ rate mea-
sures of trade liberalization, the interaction term between our distance measure and the openness measures
consistently proves to be statistically signiﬁcant, and negatively signed. Thus that sector further from the
technological frontier, are more likely to beneﬁt from trade liberalization, than sectors close to the frontier.
Note however, that for the speciﬁcations controlling for anti export bias and export tax as the measures of
trade orientation, do not report a statistically signiﬁcant ﬁnding on the interaction between the distance and
trade measure. This pattern of ﬁndings is invariant to controlling for the endogeneity of distance, scale and
protection - see the results of Table 6. The implication of these ﬁndings given the theoretical framework we
consider in this paper is that South African manufacturing ﬁrms are not suﬃciently far from the technological
frontier, for trade liberalization to exercise a negative impact on productivity growth.
The direct impact of the measures of the extent of trade liberalization of the South African manufac-
turing sectors are statistically signiﬁcant for all trade liberalization measures but the export tax measure,
irrespective of whether endogeneity is controlled for by GMM estimation. The inference from the estimated
positive signs on the trade protection measures is that an increase in trade protection raises productivity
growth in South African manufacturing. Two considerations qualify this ﬁnding, however, First, the net
eﬀect across the direct and indirect impacts of trade protection for the eﬀective protection rate, the nominal
tariﬀ rate, the export tax and the anti-export bias computed at the mean values of the protection measures
and the respective interaction terms, is 0.01, −0.01, −0.07 and −0.05 respectively.
It is also worth noting that we also tested extensively more parsimonious speciﬁcations of the empirical
model given by equation (13), isolating explicitly the impacts of trade liberalization to emerge from our
theoretical exposition. Again, estimation controlled extensively for ﬁxed and time eﬀects, as well as for the
endogeneity of the distance and scale measures through GMM estimation, and using all four measures of trade
protection. Estimation results are reported in Appendix 1, in Tables A1 through A4. What is striking about
the results that exclude the range of additional estimators controlling for pricing power, market structure,
the exchange rate, skills composition of the labour force, or that include these measures individually, is that
the direct impact of the measures of the trade dispensation are generally statistically signiﬁcant, robust to
the inclusion of industry and/or time ﬁxed eﬀects, and ﬁnd a negative direct eﬀect of the trade protection
measure on productivity growth - with the sole exception of the anti export bias measure, for which the
have Rosenbluth indexes that span the 0.001 to 0.213 range, a 0.01 unit increase represents a fairly large proportional increase
in concentration.
13positive sign of the fuller speciﬁcation persists, though with vanishingly small economic magnitudes. Thus
higher levels of trade protection are associated with signiﬁcant direct reductions in productivity growth in
South African manufacturing sectors.
These ﬁndings, and the established negative association between the measure of pricing power used for this
study and import penetration,34 suggest that while greater openness is associated with higher productivity
growth, the most important aspects of the impact of trade reform is through the diﬀerential impact on
small and large industries, and industries close or far from the technological frontier. The direct impact of
liberalization hides the signiﬁcant action.
Nominal exchange rate movements have only limited impact on productivity growth, which is statistically
signiﬁcant provided that time eﬀects are not controlled for. The impact is the generally anticipated ﬁnding
of productivity growth associated with a nominal depreciation of the currency, and the result is robust to
alternative measures of trade protection, as well as controlling for endogeneity by means of GMM estimation.
However, note that for a 1 Rand to the Dollar depreciation, the gain in productivity growth amounts to 0.01
percentage points - not a particularly strong association in economic terms. Moreover, controlling for time
eﬀects also serves to lower the statistical signiﬁcance of the exchange rate eﬀect.
We conclude the results section by noting that the results reported above are robust to controlling for the
endogeneity of the scale and distance measures through GMM estimation. Results are reported in Table 6. as
expected, under the GMM instrumentation strategy both economic and statistical signiﬁcance is diminished
for most dimensions controlled for in estimation. However, the substantive and econometric conclusions
identiﬁed above continue to hold under GMM.
6 Conclusion and Evaluation
This paper has provided a new approach for the examination of the linkage between trade liberalization and
productivity growth.
The theoretical framework employed in the paper, while acknowledging a direct impact of openness
on growth, also serves to highlight that the impact of trade liberalization on growth may also operate
through indirect channels. Speciﬁcally, the prediction is that smaller sectors should beneﬁtm o r ef r o m
trade liberalization, since they stand to realize greater proportional gains in their scale of production than
large sectors. In addition, while distance from the technological frontier per sê is negatively associated
with productivity growth, innovation in sectors in which ﬁrms are closer to the technological frontier reacts
positively to an increase in product market competition due to trade liberalization, but where they lag
considerably behind the frontier, the impact of the liberalization reverses.
We report empirical results from panel estimations for the South African manufacturing sector.
Results conﬁrm that the greatest positive impact of trade liberalization will be on small rather than
large sectors of the manufacturing sector. While distance from the technological frontier per sê is positively
(though statistically insigniﬁcantly) associated with productivity growth, South African manufacturing ﬁrms
are not suﬃciently far from the technological frontier, for trade liberalization to exercise a negative impact
on productivity growth. Importantly, while the direct impact of trade liberalization on productivity growth
appears to be negative, the net eﬀect of liberalization accounting for scale distribution and distance from
technological frontier of South African manufacturing industry is positive. Where only the direct eﬀect of
trade liberalization is controlled for, the impact is unambiguously positive.
Given the strengthening of the impact of product market competition on productivity growth when trade
liberalization is controlled for, results suggests that trade liberalization lowers the pricing power of domestic
producers, thereby limiting the negative impacts of insuﬃcient product market competition on long run
economic growth. While Rodrick (2006) was therefore correct to caution that the trade context is important
to the quantiﬁcation of the impact of pricing power on productivity growth, the impact of trade liberalization
is not such as to eliminate the impact of pricing power - instead it enhances its importance. Not controlling
for the reduction in trade protection biases the impact of pricing power downward. Further, and crucially
for the policy context we also note that liberalization of the South African economy is incomplete at present.
Further results conﬁrm the positive impact of scale of production on productivity growth, while pricing
power as well as industry concentration in the manufacturing sector are strongly negatively associated with
34See the analysis in Fedderke et al (2007).
14productivity growth. By contrast, the skills composition of the labour force is not signiﬁcantly associated
with productivity growth.
Finally, nominal depreciation of the exchange rate is associated with increased productivity growth in
South African manufacturing - though the eﬀect is economically small, and of limited statistical robustness.
Policy implications to follow from the analysis aﬃrms the importance of trade liberalization as a means
of raising productivity growth. Impact of the liberalization may be direct, but will also stand to beneﬁts m a l l
sectors of the economy disproportionately, and serve to discipline the pricing power of domestic producers.
By contrast, depreciation of the domestic currency is vastly inferior as a means of promoting productivity
growth.
7A p p e n d i x 1
INSERT TABLES A1 THROUGH A4 ABOUT HERE.
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16Table 1: List of 3-Digit Manufacturing Sectors included in the Study 
Sector Sector Sector Sector
Food Footwear  Plastic products Machinery & equip.
Beverages Wood & wood products Glass & glass products TV, radio & comm equip.
Tobacco Furniture Non-metallic minerals Transport equip
Textiles  Paper & paper products Basic iron & steel Prof.& scien. equip.
Wearing apparel Industrial Chemicals Basic non-ferrous metals Other manuf.
Leather & leather products Rubber products Metal products excl. mach.
 
 
17Table 2: Distance of South African 3 Digit Manufacturing Sectors from the US Technological Frontier 
 
 Sector  1988-2004 1988-1993 1994-1999 2000-2004
Food  (301-304)  0.18 0.24 0.15 0.11 
Beverages  (305)  0.06 0.08 0.04 0.04 
Tobacco  (306)  0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Textiles  (311-312)  0.21 0.16 0.28 0.16 
Wearing apparel (313-315)  0.28  0.21  0.33  0.34 
Leather & leather products (316)  0.11 0.17 0.08 0.06 
Footwear  (317)  0.46 0.92 0.21 0.05 
Wood & wood products (321-322)  0.15  0.07  0.17  0.26 
Furniture  (391)  0.17 0.15 0.13 0.26 
Paper & paper products (323)  0.31  0.57  0.17  0.08 
Industrial Chemicals  0.04  0.04  0.02  n/a 
Rubber products (337)  0.15  0.16  0.11  0.24 
Plastic products (338)  0.68  0.23  0.80  1.33 
Glass & glass products (341)  0.20  0.12  0.31  0.15 
Non-metallic minerals (342)  0.09 0.19 0.04 0.01 
Basic iron & steel (351)  0.25  0.39  0.22  0.03 
Basic non-ferrous metals (352)  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.00 
Metal products excluding machinery (353-355)  0.21  0.28  0.15  0.18 
Machinery & equipment (356-359)  0.44  0.44  0.46  0.43 
Television, radio & communication equipment (371-373) 0.65  0.65  0.77  0.39 
Transport equipment (381-387)  0.13  0.16  0.13  0.10 
Professional & scientific equipment  (374-376)  0.32 0.35 0.38 0.12 




Table 3: Broad Patterns to Emerge From Distance From Technological Frontier Measurement, 1970-2002 
 
Sectors with Growing Productivity Gap Sectors with Narrowing Productivity Gap Sectors with Falling, then Rising Productivity Gap
Food (301-304) Wearing apparel (313-315) Textiles (311-312)
Beverages (305) Wood & wood products (321-322) Glass & glass products (341)
Tobacco (306) Furniture (391) Machinery & equipment (356-359)
Leather & leather products (316) Rubber products (337) Television, radio & communication equipment (371-373)
Footwear (317) Plastic products (338) Professional & scientific equipment (374-376)
Wood & wood products (321-322)
Paper & paper products (323)
Industrial Chemicals
Non-metallic minerals (342)
Basic iron & steel (351)
Basic non-ferrous metals (352)
Metal products excluding machinery (353-355)
Transport equipment (381-387)
Other manufacturing (392-393)  
 
19Table 4: Scale Measure of South African Manufacturing Industry Size 
 
1970-2002 1970s 1980-1993 1994-2002
Food (301-304) 0.078 0.069 0.084 0.079
Beverages (305) 0.215 0.136 0.253 0.243
Tobacco (306) 0.188 0.255 0.206 0.087
Textiles (311-312) 0.079 0.066 0.093 0.071
Wearing apparel (313-315) 0.091 0.049 0.091 0.138
Leather & leather products (316) 0.112 0.068 0.110 0.164
Footwear (317) 0.345 0.186 0.375 0.475
Wood & wood products (321-322) 0.105 0.084 0.113 0.117
Furniture (391) 0.046 0.036 0.051 0.048
Paper & paper products (323) 0.079 0.063 0.082 0.091
Industrial Chemicals 0.039 0.039 0.078 -
Rubber products (337) 0.076 0.051 0.085 0.089
Plastic products (338) 0.055 0.038 0.061 0.064
Glass & glass products (341) 0.056 0.037 0.058 0.073
Non-metallic minerals (342) 0.124 0.116 0.141 0.105
Basic iron & steel (351) 0.160 0.098 0.173 0.208
Basic non-ferrous metals (352) 0.126 0.051 0.124 0.213
Metal products excluding machinery (353-355) 0.099 0.099 0.114 0.073
Machinery & equipment (356-359) 0.043 0.043 0.048 0.036
Electrical machinery_TV_Communication 0.029 0.024 0.033 0.030
Transport equipment (381-387) 0.062 0.061 0.065 0.058
Professional & scientific equipment (374-376) 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.007
Other manufacturing (392-393) 0.306 0.154 0.342 0.421  
20 
Table 5: Determinants of Productivity Growth in South African Manufacturing Sectors 
* denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; *** denotes significance at the 10% level 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 

































































































































































                
Industry Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
N  200  200  200  200  200  200  200  200 
Adj‐R
2  0.23  0.40  0.23  0.40  0.22  0.38  0.24  0.40 
 
21Table 6: Determinants of Productivity Growth in South African Manufacturing Sectors Under Instrumentation Strategy 
* denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; *** denotes significance at the 10% level 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 



















































































        
Industry Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
GMM  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  200  200  200  200 
RSS/TSS
  0.53  0.53  0.55  0.53 
Wald (joint)  137.9*  86.2*  63.84*  119.4* 
Wald (dumies)  1593*  3501*  719.3*  2.6e+004* 
Wald (Time)  89.42*  91.46*  57.98*  61.81* 
Sargan  122.9  119.7  120.8  120.9 
AR(1) ‐ 1.73*** ‐ 1.74*** ‐ 1.62 ‐ 1.58 
AR(2)  0.16  0.02  0.17 ‐ 0.06 
22 
Figure 1: 











































































































25Figure 4: Rand – Dollar Nominal Exchange Rate 
 
 
26Table A1: Productivity Impact of Openness – Effective Protection Rates  
* denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; *** denotes significance at the 10% level 
  (1)  (2)  (4)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 










































































Markup          ‐ 0.09 
(0.06) 
  
Concentration           ‐ 0.69*** 
(0.39) 
 
Skills Ratio            ‐ 0.11 
(0.11) 
            
Industry Effects  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Effects  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
GMM  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  338  338  338  338  338  338  338  338  200  338 
Adj‐R
2  0.02  0.05  0.25    0.26  0.25  0.28  0.29  0.26 
RSS/TSS      0.78  0.78       
Wald (joint)      14.04 *  16.98*       
Wald (dummies)      467*  469*       
Wald (time)      466*  427*       
Sargan      107.3  159.5       
AR(1)      1.57 ‐ 1.40       
AR(2)      0.15  0.06       
27Table A2: Productivity Impact of Openness – Nominal Tariffs 
* denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; *** denotes significance at the 10% level 
  (1)  (2)  (4)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 










































































Markup          ‐ 0.09 
(0.06) 
  
Concentration           ‐ 0.69*** 
(0.40) 
 
Skills Ratio            ‐ 0.08 
(0.12) 
            
Industry Effects  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Effects  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
GMM  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  338  338  338  338  338  338  338  315  200  338 
Adj‐R
2  0.02  0.07  0.25    0.26  0.24  0.28  0.29  0.25 
RSS/TSS      0.78  0.79       
Wald (joint)      0.50  4.03       
Wald (dummies)      491*  503*       
Wald (time)      489*  401*       
Sargan      107.6  157.7       
AR(1)      1.59  1.44       
AR(2)      0.20  0.12       
28Table A3: Productivity Impact of Openness – Export Taxes 
* denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; *** denotes significance at the 10% level 
  (1)  (2)  (4)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
  Prod. Growth  Prod. Growth  Prod. Growth  Prod. 
Growth 










































































Markup          ‐ 0.08 
(0.07) 
  
Concentration           ‐ 0.62 
(0.40) 
 
Skills Ratio            ‐ 0.07 
(0.12) 
            
Industry Effects  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Effects  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
GMM  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  338  338  338  338  338  338  338  315  200  338 
Adj‐R
2  0.01  0.06  0.25    0.25  0.25  0.27  0.29  0.25 
RSS/TSS      0.79  0.79       
Wald (joint)      0.13  4.52       
Wald (dummies)      450*  507.5*       
Wald (time)      450*  410.9*       
Sargan      122  158.2       
AR(1)      1.63  1.47       
AR(2)      0.22  0.11       
29Table A4: Productivity Impact of Openness – Anti Export Bias 
* denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; *** denotes significance at the 10% level 
  (1)  (2)  (4)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
  Prod. Growth  Prod. Growth  Prod. Growth  Prod. 
Growth 







































































R/$          0.01** 
(0.004) 
   
Markup           ‐ 0.06 
(0.07) 
  
Concentration            ‐ 0.54 
(0.41) 
 
Skills Ratio             ‐ 0.05 
(0.13) 
             
Industry Effects  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Effects  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
GMM  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  338  338  338  338  338  338  338  315  200  338 
Adj‐R
2  0.01  0.01  0.25     0.25  0.25  0.27  0.29  0.25 
RSS/TSS      0.78  0.79       
Wald (joint)      25.43*  44.4*       
Wald (dummies)      375*  491*       
Wald (time)      372*  404*       
Sargan      107.0  157.2       
AR(1)      1.61  1.48       
AR(2)      0.17  0.07       
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